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DEVELOPMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE 
VOTING AGE 
Katharine Silbaugh* 
ABSTRACT 
Several municipalities have lowered the voting age to 16, with 
similar bills pending in state legislatures and one considered by 
Congress.  Meanwhile, advocates for youth are trying to raise the ages 
of majority across an array of areas of law, including ages for 
diverting criminal conduct into the juvenile justice system (18 to 21); 
buying tobacco (18 to 21); driving (16 to 18); and obtaining support 
from the foster care system (18 to 21).  Child welfare advocates are 
fighting the harms of Adultification, meaning the projection of adult 
capacities, responsibilities, and consequences onto minors.  In legal 
and social history, seeing 16- and 17-year-olds as possessing adult 
capacities has connected with holding them responsible for adult 
decision-making, particularly in the criminal justice system, but also in 
disciplinary mechanisms at school.  This effect is dramatically worse 
for children of color.  These two movements are in tension; child 
welfare advocates are fighting Adultification while democracy 
advocates are fighting for younger entry into the adult political 
sphere.  But the age of majority is not a technicality.  It is a thick 
fabric of public and private laws formed for the protection of children 
and adolescents, an interwoven safety net, whose efficacy depends on 
the strength of the weave.  Indeed, the age of majority plays a 
protective role in our 18-year-old voting age; the 16-year-old 
franchise exposes youth to constitutionally protected campaigning, 
inviting commercial and political interests to target teenagers with 
“political speech.”  Currently, public law shields teenagers from this 
contact for fear they will be exploited, and private law enables 
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parents to constrict campaign interactions with teenagers.  Countless 
similar underappreciated harms of Adultification can carelessly 
deprive children of educational, housing, employment, and civic 
futures.  The minor extant intrusions on the age of majority, such as 
the driving age, pale in comparison to the civic meaning of lowering 
the age of the franchise.  When the voting age dropped from 21 to 18, 
states lowered their legal age of majority from 21 to 18 in response, 
influencing policies such as aging out of foster care and entitlement to 
child support beyond 18.  As a core marker of citizenship, voting has 
had a powerful anchoring effect on ideas about civic maturity.  
Lowering the benchmark for civic maturity threatens to anchor a 
lower age for civic protection, as occurred when the 26th Amendment 
passed.  This Article contends that 16- to 18-year-olds are entitled to 
their childhoods, as Greta Thunberg contends, with our protection 
and support, not to the burdens of adult hopes, adult expectations, 
adult uses, and adult consequences.  It makes a claim for 
developmental justice grounded in participatory democracy.  
Lowering the voting age works at cross-purposes to the essential task 
of protecting youth from premature engagement with the criminal 
justice system, and with the long-term disenfranchisement that can 
come with that entanglement.  With Adultification risking 
criminalization and criminalization risking disenfranchisement, 
current thinking about youth voting exposes disparities in public 
ambition for the future political participation of youth arising from 
the disparities in their childhood experiences. 
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“This is all wrong.  I shouldn’t be up here.  I should be back in 
school on the other side of the ocean.  Yet you all come to us young 
people for hope?  How dare you.  You have stolen my dreams and my 
childhood with your empty words.” 
- 16-year-old Greta Thunberg, 2019 UN Climate Action Summit, 
September 20191 
INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT, POSITIVE RIGHTS, AND TEEN 
VOTING 
On March 7, 2019, Representative Ayanna Pressley went to the 
floor of Congress to introduce legislation to lower the voting age 
nationally from 18 to 16, saying, “[f]rom gun violence, to immigration 
reform, to climate change, to the future of work — our young people 
are organizing, mobilizing and calling us to action.  They are at the 
forefront of social and legislative movements and have earned 
inclusion in our democracy.”2  Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, 
the most powerful legislator in the United States, favors lowering the 
voting age to 16, and she supported a local ballot initiative in the 2016 
election in San Francisco that would have given 16-year-olds the right 
to vote in local elections.3  In 2019, 125 members of Congress 
supported such a move at the federal level.  With the help of the 
advocacy organization Vote16usa.org,4 a movement has begun to 
lower the voting age to 16, with bills pending in a number of state 
 
 1. Greta Thunberg: You Are Failing Us. How Dare You, CNN (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/videos/health/2019/09/23/greta-thunberg-powerful-unga-
climate-change-speech-sot-vpx.cnn [https://perma.cc/3X7N-FVXM]. 
 2. Press Release, Representative Ayanna Pressley, Rep. Pressley’s Floor 
Remarks on Lowering the Voting Age (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://pressley.house.gov/media/press-releases/rep-pressleys-floor-remarks-lowering-
voting-age [https://perma.cc/3SAX-SPYL]. 
 3. John Bowden, Pelosi Says She Backs Lowering Voting Age to 16, HILL (Mar. 
14, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/434115-pelosi-says-she-backs-
lowering-voting-age-to-16 [https://perma.cc/RCK9-JHMV]. 
 4. See generally VOTE16 USA, http://vote16usa.org/ [https://perma.cc/WSN3-
H3BC] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). 
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legislatures aimed at aspects of that goal.5  Recently, these ideas have 
motivated successful efforts to lower the voting age to 16 in several 
cities and towns, and the introduction of the Bill in the current 
Congress to do so for federal elections.6  The movement is premised, 
in part, on the notion that neuroscience and our improved knowledge 
of development indicate that for voting, 16-year-olds have sufficient 
cognitive development.7  This Article will examine the movement to 
lower the voting age through the lens of developmental equality, 
contending that neuroscience and youth activism are not the only 
metrics for understanding the laws protecting youth. 
State conceptions of 16-year-olds have another consequence. 
Nationwide, over 800,000 juveniles were arrested in 2017.8  While the 
number of juvenile arrests has declined from over 2 million as 
 
 5. State Legislatures Consider Vote16, VOTE16 USA, https://vote16usa.org/state-
legislatures-consider-vote16/ [https://perma.cc/QCV3-PHJ6] (last visited Jan. 10, 
2020). 
 6. In two Maryland towns, Takoma Park and Hyattsville, for example, 16-year-
olds now enjoy the right to vote in municipal elections. See Lindsay A. Powers, 
Takoma Park Grants 16-year-olds Right to Vote, WASH. POST (May 14, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/takoma-park-grants-16-year-olds-right-to-
vote/2013/05/14/b27c52c4-bccd-11e2-89c9-3be8095fe767_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z8HX-9MM7]; Kara Voght, There’s a Growing Movement to Let 
16-year-olds Vote. It Would Change Everything, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/04/theres-a-growing-movement-to-let-16-
year-olds-vote-it-would-change-everything [https://perma.cc/5EBY-HSYZ]. 
Berkeley, California is close to completing the same reform, and the entire state of 
California may soon become the first in the nation to lower its voting age. See 
Measure Y1 Passes to Lower Voting Age for School Board Elections, VOTE16 USA, 
https://vote16usa.org/project/berkeley-ca [https://perma.cc/PK82-FVRC] (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2020); see also Tyler Okeke & Luis Sanchez, California Is Taking Steps to 
Lower The Voting Age — Here’s Why, TEEN VOGUE (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/california-bill-lower-voting-age-17-passes-assembly 
[https://perma.cc/48WN-WHJG]. See generally Yamiche Alcindor, Campaign to 
Lower Voting Age to 16 in Local Races Ignites a Debate, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 9, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/us/politics/campaign-to-lower-voting-age-to-16-
in-local-races-ignites-a-debate.html [https://perma.cc/B674-L6MB]; Nik DeCosta-
Klipa, Ayanna Pressley is Introducing Legislation to Lower the Federal Voting Age, 
BOSTON.COM (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2019/03/06/ayanna-pressley-voting-age-16 
[https://perma.cc/H8PL-LM9X]. 
 7. See, e.g., Vivian Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, Cognitive Development, 
and the Age of Electoral Majority, 77 BROOK L. REV. 1447, 1513 (2012). 
 8. Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Estimated Number of 
Juvenile Arrests, 2017, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/qa05101.asp?qaDate=2017 
[https://perma.cc/6J4S-WZK5] (last visited Jan. 12, 2020); see also Office of Juvenile 
Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Arrest Trends by Offense, Age, and Gender, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST., https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/ucr_trend.asp?table_in=1 
[https://perma.cc/FEC2-3KY9] (last visited Jan. 12, 2020). 
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recently as 2007, the racial disparity in juvenile justice involvement is 
increasing.9  The District of Columbia, where Pressley gave her 
speech, continues to have among the highest rates of youth in the 
physical custody of the juvenile justice system.10  The involvement of 
those youth in the juvenile justice system dramatically increases the 
odds that they will develop an adult criminal record,11 which will 
undermine their futures as voters, and in seeking employment, 
housing, and education.12  Just next door in Virginia, 22% of the 
African American population continues to be disenfranchised due to 
past felony convictions.13  Approximately 6.1 million Americans 
cannot vote because of felony disenfranchisement,14 and 
approximately 12 million Americans between the ages of 16 and 18 
cannot vote due to age.15 
This Article contends that 16- to 18-year-olds are entitled to their 
childhoods, as Greta Thunberg contends, with our protection and 
support, not to the burdens of adult hopes, adult expectations, and 
adult consequences.  They are not to be used.  When we see 16-year-
olds, we should see their capacity, but we should focus on their need 
for protection and developmental support.  In legal and social history, 
the overall impact of seeing 16- and 17-year-olds as possessing adult 
capacities connects with a tendency to hold them responsible for adult 
decision-making, particularly in the criminal justice system, but also in 
 
 9. Id.; Joshua Rovner, Racial Disparities in Youth Commitments and Arrests, 
SENTENCING PROJECT (Apr. 1, 2016) [https://perma.cc/B674-L6MB]. 
 10. State-By-State Data, SENTENCING PROJECT, 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racial-disparities-in-youth-
commitments-and-arrests/ [https://perma.cc/VK2B-SXHY] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020). 
 11. FACT SHEET: Reducing Recidivism for Justice-Involved Youth, U.S. DEP’T 
EDUC. (Dec. 2, 2012), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/fact-sheet-reducing-
recidivism-justice-involved-youth [https://perma.cc/WQJ8-P9XM]; see also Reducing 
Juvenile Recidivism, COUNCIL ST. GOVS. JUST. CTR., 
https://csgjusticecenter.org/youth/reducing-juvenile-recidivism/ 
[https://perma.cc/68CV-7G7L]. 
 12. See Sarah Berson, Beyond the Sentence — Understanding Collateral 
Consequences, U.S. DEP’T JUST., OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, 
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/beyond-sentence-understanding-collateral-
consequences [https://perma.cc/6Z8H-C4YS]. 
 13. State-By-State Data, supra note 10. 
 14. Jean Chung, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer, SENTENCING PROJECT 
(June 27, 2019), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/felony-
disenfranchisement-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/4TYV-7AT4]. 
 15. Child Population by Age Group in the United States, KIDS COUNT DATA 
CTR., https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/101-child-population-by-age-group 
[https://perma.cc/3NL5-KU8V] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020). 
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disciplinary mechanisms at school.16  That tendency is dramatically 
worse for children of color.17  Advocates for youth are trying to raise 
the age for diverting criminal conduct into the juvenile justice system 
from 18 to 21, a movement aimed at extending civic protection to 
childhood and reversing the serious harms of Adultification.18  To be 
a minor is to have a protective status, conceptually rich and legally 
significant. 
These movements are in tension; child welfare advocates are 
fighting Adultification while democracy advocates are fighting for a 
lower age to enter the adult political sphere.  That tension cannot be 
minimized with assurances about the genuinely good intentions of the 
Vote16 movement.  This Article juxtaposes the movement to lower 
the voting age to 16 based in part on neuroscience with the 
contrasting grooming of many 16-year-olds via the juvenile justice 
system to lose the franchise for long portions of their lives.  Through 
that juxtaposition, this Article considers a claim for developmental 
justice for children and youth grounded in participatory democracy.  
Lowering the voting age works at cross-purposes to the essential task 
of protecting youth from premature engagement with the criminal 
justice system, and with the long-term disenfranchisement that comes 
with that entanglement.  Adultification is shown to lead to lessening 
of social and civic support for teenagers,19 and this Article argues that 
 
 16. Phillip Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: The Consequences of 
Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 501, 526–45 
(2014). See generally REBECCA EPSTEIN ET AL., GEO. UNIV. LAW CTR., CTR. ON 
POVERTY & INEQUALITY, GIRLHOOD INTERRUPTED: THE ERASURE OF BLACK GIRLS 
CHILDHOOD (2017), https://endadultificationbias.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/girlhood-interrupted.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NXR-Q8HQ]. 
 17. See generally JAMILIA BLAKE & REBECCA EPSTEIN, GEO. UNIV. LAW CTR., 
CTR. ON POVERTY & INEQUALITY, LISTENING TO BLACK WOMEN AND GIRLS: LIVED 
EXPERIENCES OF ADULTIFICATION BIAS 1–2 (2017), 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/poverty-inequality-center/wp-
content/uploads/sites/14/2019/05/Listening-to-Black-Women-and-Girls.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B9DW-XC63]; EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16. 
 18. See John Kelley, In Another Big Year for “Raise The Age” Laws, One State 
Now Considers All Teens as Juveniles, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (June 25, 2018), 
https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/youth-services-insider/juvenile-justice-raise-the-
age-vermont-missouri-state-legislation/31430 [https://perma.cc/9FFM-Z3J3]; Teresa 
Wiltz, How ‘Raise The Age’ Laws Might Reduce Recidivism, PEW CHARITABLE 
TRS. (May 31, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/05/31/how-raise-the-age-laws-might-reduce-recidivism 
[https://perma.cc/3JC2-E6K9]; see also Aidan Ryan, Crime Bill Would Redefine 
Juveniles as Up to Age 21, BOS. GLOBE (July 9, 2019), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/07/09/crime-bill-would-redefine-juveniles-
age/maHshbBT6QaaX9ooVDVidN/story.html [https://perma.cc/KR8S-TZUX]. 
 19. See generally Blake & Epstein, supra note 17; Goff et al., supra note 16. 
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the political significance of voting carries with it a particularly potent 
threat of worsening those processes. 
In their urgent drive to improve political engagement, democracy 
activists should pause to consider the value of the age of majority.  
The age of majority is neither arbitrary nor technical.  The age of 
majority is a system, a thick fabric of public and private laws formed 
for the protection of children and adolescents.  Dismissing the 
significance of the age of majority belies the function and importance 
of that legal system.  It is too clever to deploy imperfections and 
irregularities in that fabric to argue that the age of majority lacks 
content.  As long as its protections are meaningful, every intrusion 
requires substantial consideration not simply of the capacity of 
children, which is the focus of Vote16’s campaign, but of the 
protective function of legal childhood.  The public and private body 
of law surrounding minors forms an interwoven safety net, whose 
efficacy depends on the strength of the weave.  The impact of minor 
intrusions on the notion of adulthood, such as driving at age 16, pale 
in comparison to the civic significance of lowering the age of the 
franchise. 
This web of public and private law defining legal childhood often 
protects in ways we fail to notice. As just one example, the age of 
majority is playing a protective function in the case of the current 
voting age.  Political speech, including campaign speech, enjoys the 
greatest protection in our constitutional and democratic system.  With 
the franchise comes exposure to campaign speech.  Vote16 invites the 
targeting of teenagers by corporate and political interests with 
“political speech” from which we have typically attempted to protect 
them.20  Tobacco companies, the military, credit card companies, and 
all manner of commercial interests are currently regulated in their 
ability to communicate with minors, in part because minors are 
deemed too vulnerable to exploitation.21 But all of these entities have 
urgent political interests that inform political campaigns, and enjoy 
protected rights to communicate with voters. I have seen nothing in 
the Vote16 movement that contends with this legal conflict. 
 
 20. For example, military recruiters may not speak to children until the turn 18 
without parental permission; cigarette companies may not market to teens; teenagers 
may be blocked by parents from gun advocacy websites; credit card companies may 
not induce teens to borrow. See infra Section IV. 
 21. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, ADVERTISING TO KIDS AND THE FTC: A 
REGULATORY RETROSPECTIVE THAT ADVISES THE PRESENT (2004), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/advertising-kids-
and-ftc-regulatory-retrospective-advises-present/040802adstokids.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JHC7-A7GV]. 
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Restriction on targeting youth is but one example of the sometimes 
invisible protective function of legal childhood, a protective function 
that is remarkably absent from the Vote16 discourse. Vote16 
advocates will eventually be forced to address this particular issue as 
campaigners conflict with state regulation on communicating with 
minors and as parents exercise their right to limit campaign contact 
with their 16-year-old children. When they do, will it open up for 
them broader questions about the general harms of Adultification, 
and the risks that their movement will lower the anchor for countless 
other protections associated with legal minority? 
In Reimagining Equality: A New Deal for Children of Color,22 
Nancy Dowd makes a case for a new legal concept: developmental 
equality.  The claim is this: African American boys, and all children, 
are entitled to conditions that will allow for adequate development.  
Dowd explains that “[d]evelopmental equality identifies the structural 
components of inequality created and sustained by the state that 
generate hierarchies among children.”23  She marshals neuroscience 
and new understandings of trauma and adverse childhood 
experiences to focus our attention on the developmental injustices 
suffered by African American children due to three factors in 
particular — poverty, poor treatment in school, and excessive 
involvement with the juvenile justice system, each of which engages 
state action.  Dowd powerfully melds conceptions about development 
from neuroscience with social structures: “[a] strong surrounding 
environment provides the basis for the best development of brain 
architecture: because the brain is developing at a fast rate, the rate of 
development and the nature of development depend on experiences, 
and on interactions and relationships with others.”24  Often, 
discussion of cognitive development and maturity in law is relatively 
detached from the context and experiences that shape development, 
so they miss the normative social, economic, and educational 
circumstances that problematize narratives about “typical” 
development.  Dowd’s focus on environment and resources liberates 
the language of neuroscience from the risks that it will draw us inward 
toward examining psychological states as though they are endogenous 
rather than a product of resources and state action that are highly 
relevant to any discussion of equality or justice. 
 
 22. NANCY E. DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY: A NEW DEAL FOR CHILDREN OF 
COLOR (2018). 
 23. Id. at 3. 
 24. Id. at 104–05. 
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Dowd recognizes that she is making a case for positive rights, 
though claims for positive rights have been difficult in our federal 
system, even for children.25  Dowd asks us to revisit fundamental 
ideas about rights more broadly, but she also grounds the claim for 
positive rights to development more narrowly in childhood 
exceptionalism.26  Social inequality during childhood impacts 
development and life course, even as developmentally disadvantaged 
groups show resilience in generating coping mechanisms in response 
to trauma, poverty, violence, and inequality.27  Dowd contends that 
the unequal developmental opportunities children experience result 
from state action, and the developmental equality model provides a 
focus on those state actions.  Once policy-created childhood 
hierarchies influence children’s development, adult equality becomes 
more difficult to achieve.  Dowd argues that “[u]ndermining 
development generates potentially lifelong subordinating 
consequences that are difficult or impossible to overcome.”28  Who 
we are emerges in part from the conditions we experienced during 
development, long before we have the capacities to steer ourselves 
through the decision-making of the hypothesized adult in a liberal 
democracy.  Dowd claims a positive right to development within our 
constitutional system, and mines aspects of constitutional law to call 
forth these positive rights to developmental equality.  This Article 
presses the case for developmental justice in the context of the 
franchise.  It argues that conceptions of youth and the franchise 
expose vast disparities in public ambition for the future political 
participation of youth and children arising out of vast disparities in 
developmental experiences. 
Lowering the voting age based on an idealized version of 
development risks Adultification: the projection of adult 
responsibilities associated with adult rights, at a time when children 
need our continued, formal support, from government, community, 
neighborhood, and family.  The fight for justice in the provision of 
that support, and against dramatically unequal childhoods, requires 
 
 25. Even in the context of children, the Supreme Court has refused to recognize 
any positive rights to state support or protection under the federal Constitution. See, 
e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (no 
constitutional right to protection from child abuse); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (no constitutional right to a public education). 
Children do enjoy positive rights to education under all state constitutions. See 
generally infra Section III. 
 26. See DOWD, supra note 22, at 80, 130. 
 27. Id. at 32–41, 61–65. 
 28. Id. at 3–4. 
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viewing 16- and 17-year-olds as children for purposes of our public 
obligation to them.  Without diminishing the power and presence 
many youths of this age possess, it is a mistake to carve out this single 
aspect of their capacity from the more important context, which is the 
fight for truly enabling and protecting development provided on an 
equal basis.  Speaking of teenagers as actualized near-adults, when 
the state is assaulting their cognitive, social, emotional, and civic 
development by processing so many of them through the juvenile 
justice system and school disciplinary processes, threatens to lead us 
away from focusing on their needs, and our own civic obligation to 
meet those needs. 
The Parkland students, who energized a national conversation 
about reform of gun laws, serve as the normative basis for the 
movement to lower the voting age, the central example of 
contemporary student political voice.29  At the same time, they may 
exemplify the relatively privileged ideas of child development that 
trouble Dowd, despite the conscious inclusion efforts made by the 
Parkland leaders.30  If development is a dynamic process rather than a 
decontextualized one, and if cognitive development is shaped in part 
by disparate state action rather than universalized, then we need to 
acknowledge a politics to development as we speak about the 
franchise. 
When considering voting rights, the image of the Parkland students 
must expand in light of excessive and discriminatory involvement of 
African American teenagers with the juvenile justice system.  
Because so many states, formally or functionally, permanently 
disenfranchise citizens with a felony record, excessive teen 
involvement in the juvenile justice system begs consideration of the 
 
 29. See, e.g., Voght, supra note 6; see also Susan Jones, Democrats Point to 
Student Gun-Control Activists As a Reason to Lower Voting Age to 16, CNS NEWS 
(Mar. 6, 2019, 7:57 AM), https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/susan-
jones/democrats-point-student-gun-control-activists-reason-lower-voting-age-16 
[https://perma.cc/7C93-4NXT]. 
 30. See DOWD, supra note 22, at 65. Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, the 
site of the Parkland, Florida school shooting, is a majority white school but is more 
diverse than the typical American high school. The recognizable leaders of the 
movement spawned by the shooting appear to be predominantly white, with the 
exception of Emma Gonzales. See Sarah Ruiz-Grossman, Black Parkland Students 
Want Peers to ‘Share the Mic’, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/black-students-marjory-stoneman-march-for-
our-lives-gun-violence-movement_n_5ac5548ce4b056a8f59810f9 
[https://perma.cc/F62K-NK9U];School Directory Information for Marjory Stoneman 
Douglas High School, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 
https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/schoolsearch/school_detail.asp?Search=1&ID=120018002721 
[https://perma.cc/MG57-EE7W] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).  
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impact on political participation.  While new legal reform efforts 
focus on enhancing the political voice of predominantly white 
teenagers by enfranchising them, African American youth are 
targeted by the juvenile justice system, which places them at far 
greater likelihood of funneling into the adult criminal justice system.31  
That, in turn, leads to their long-term disenfranchisement.  Therefore, 
many Black teenagers are now in the process of becoming 
permanently disenfranchised, just as more advantaged teenagers are 
being offered the franchise at age 16, as the world takes note of their 
political voice.  This is particularly distressing because a powerful 
argument for positive rights to equal development could be that 
developmental justice is a necessary foundation to meaningful 
citizenship — citizenship best exemplified by the vote — just as 
eighteenth-century leaders argued of education.  Before we think 
about enfranchising teenagers, we must think about protecting all 
teenagers from long-term disenfranchisement; otherwise, we risk 
exacerbating developmental and political inequality.  A central 
commitment of protecting teenagers includes a steadfast defense of 
legal childhood as against the harmful encroachments of 
Adultification at school, in the juvenile justice system, in the 
commercial system, and even in the political arena. 
Part I of this Article explores the voting age debate, focusing on 
the modes of argument made in support of the 26th Amendment to 
lower the voting age from 21 to 18, and their correlates in today’s 
movement to lower the voting age from 18 to 16.  Part I considers the 
movement to lower the voting age in light of the protective goals of 
the developmental justice lens.  Part II of this Article considers the 
protective function disenfranchisement plays for 16- to 18-year-olds, 
as families and governments often shield those teens from political 
speech by commercial or other organized interests.  Part III explores 
the intellectual history of a case for public education rooted in 
popular sovereignty and extends that reasoning to a positive right of 
developmental justice.  A political theory of negative rights depends 
in part on the democratic ideal of a government built and run by the 
people.  This popular sovereignty, in turn, depends upon an able 
citizenry.  The argument for state interest in preparing adults to self-
govern fueled a movement toward public schooling in the eighteenth 
century, realized more fully for white children in the nineteenth 
century.  Noah Webster wrote in 1787: 
 
 31. See DOWD, supra note 22, at 48. 
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In despotic governments, the people should have little or no 
education, except what tends to inspire them with a servile fear. 
Information is fatal to despotism . . . . The constitutions are 
republican and the laws of education are monarchical.  The former 
extend civil rights to every honest industrious man; the latter 
deprive a large proportion of the citizens of a most valuable 
privilege.  In our American republics where governments are in the 
hands of the people, knowledge should be universally diffused by 
means of public schools.  Of such consequence is it to society that 
the people who make laws should be well informed that I conceive 
no Legislature can be justified in neglecting proper establishments 
for this purpose.32 
By the time we are old enough to function as citizens, 
developmental injustice has changed who we become based in part on 
the way race frames childhood.  In this regard, we have failed the 
founders’ “republican” conception of readiness before children reach 
the voting age.  Part IV sets out the case that voting is itself a positive 
right, enabling of negative rights in much the way public education 
enables voting. 
Part V considers Dowd’s case for developmental equality through 
the lens of the franchise, and grounds developmental justice in 
positive rights.  Discussion of lowering the voting age must contend 
with the disparate paths toward and away from citizenship for 
developmentally advantaged teens and those experiencing 
developmental injustice.  The decontextualized neuroscience on 
which the voting argument rests obscures the state action which fuels 
developmental inequality.  The Article concludes that lowering the 
benchmark for civic maturity threatens to anchor a lower age for civic 
protection, as it did when the 26th Amendment passed.  That price is 
too high for too many youths in need of a more protective lens on 
teen years. 
I. THE VOTING AGE DEBATE 
In part to improve lifelong political participation and to recognize 
the stake youth have in political choices,33 in recent years a handful of 
countries, including Austria, Brazil, Argentina, Croatia, Malta, and 
 
 32. NOAH WEBSTER, On the Education of Youth in America, in A 
GRAMMATICAL INSTITUTE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 3 (1783), 
http://americainclass.org/sources/makingrevolution/independence/text3/websterameri
canidentity.pdf [https://perma.cc/EE3R-WD4Z]. 
 33. See Should 16-Year-Olds Be Given the Vote?, DEBATING EUR. (June 9, 
2019), https://www.debatingeurope.eu/2019/07/18/16-year-olds-given-
vote/#.XW7AoChKiUk [https://perma.cc/DBH9-TQ9Y]. 
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Scotland have lowered the voting age to 16.34  In the United States, 
several local jurisdictions have lowered the voting age for municipal 
elections, including Takoma Park, Maryland, and Berkeley, 
California.35  Representative Ayanna Pressley (D-MA) introduced 
legislation in Congress this term to lower the voting age to 16, and 
Nancy Pelosi has embraced the concept in principle.36  At this 
moment in time, 16- to 18-year-olds are perceived to be more likely to 
vote for Democrats than Republicans, and therefore the Democrats 
may have a self-interest in pursuing a lower voting age.37  Yet, in 
recent years the conservative movement has been actively engaged in 
promoting conservatism to high school students through its 
conservative youth organization, Turning Point USA,38 and many 
arguments for lowering the voting age bear no relationship to political 
party.  This Part considers those less-partisan arguments to 
understand what ideas about age and citizenship fuel voting age 
policy.  What is the political economy of this movement, its rhetoric, 
and underlying theory? 
Evaluation of the rhetoric surrounding the voting age suggests that 
it has not been possible to contain the meaning of the voting age to its 
 
 34. See id.; Argentina Voting Age Lowered From 18 to 16, BBC NEWS (Nov. 1, 
2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20164573 
[https://perma.cc/9N39-Q6KE]; Sharon Omondi, Legal Voting Age By Country, 
WORLDATLAS (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/legal-voting-age-
by-country.html [https://perma.cc/YX3H-PFEL]; Johannes Pleschberger, What Does 
Voting at 16 Change? The Case of Austria, EURONEWS (Nov. 9, 2018), 
https://www.euronews.com/2018/09/11/what-does-voting-at-16-change-the-case-of-
austria [https://perma.cc/8WTS-DZYU]. 
 35. See Joshua Douglas, The Right to Vote Under Local Law, 85 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1039, 1052–61 (2017); Benjamin Oosterhoff, Should 16 and 17-Year-Olds Be 
Able to Vote?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Oct. 14, 2018), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/ca/blog/civically-engaged/201810/should-16-and-
17-year-olds-be-able-vote [https://perma.cc/FZW6-ZLKF]. 
 36. See Bowden, supra note 3; DeCosta-Klipa, supra note 6. 
 37. See Emily Badger & Claire Cain Miller, How the Trump Era Is Molding the 
Next Generation of Voters, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/upshot/trump-era-molding-young-voters.html 
[https://perma.cc/5D5T-PJEJ]; Valerie Richardson, States Race Ahead of 2020 
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(Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/mar/27/2020-
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 38. See Andrew Marantz, The Parkland Provocateur Kyle Kashuv Prepares to 
Graduate, NEW YORKER (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/06/03/the-parkland-provocateur-kyle-
kashuv-prepares-to-graduate [https://perma.cc/W8Y7-5NFG]; Alexandra Yoon-
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young-conservatives.html [https://perma.cc/3H25-G4HU]. 
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own lane.  Instead, as one of the primary markers of citizenship, the 
voting age has a powerful anchoring effect on ideas about civic 
maturity, regardless of intentions.  Indeed, advocates for raising the 
age of juvenile court jurisdiction cite directly to the other legal 
benchmarks of adulthood, starting with voting: 
You have to be 18 to vote in a general election or join the military 
without your parents’ consent — and you’ve got to be 21 before you 
can belly up to the bar. 
But in some states, if you’re under 18 and you break the law, you’ll 
be treated as an adult, no matter how slight the crime — even if it’s 
just jumping a subway turnstile or shoplifting. 
Sixteen-year-olds in New York and North Carolina are still funneled 
through adult criminal courts and housed in adult prisons and jails.  
In Georgia, Michigan, Missouri, Texas and Wisconsin, 17-year-olds 
are automatically prosecuted as adults. 
Raising the age can have a huge impact on the lives of young people.  
Teens funneled into adult prisons do not have access to 
rehabilitative services that the juvenile justice system provides.  And 
adult prisons can be extremely dangerous for teens. 
Prosecuting minors as adults used to be more common.  But the 
practice has declined amid increasing awareness that young people, 
with brains that are still developing, may not fully understand the 
consequences of their actions, as well as evidence that teens are 
more likely to commit additional crimes if they are prosecuted as 
adults.39 
Advocates of a 16-year-old voting age need to take seriously the 
possibility of unintended consequences for 16-year-olds beyond the 
vote itself.  At the time the voting age dropped from 21 to 18, most 
states still called 21 the age of majority.40  Once the voting age moved 
down to 18, states lowered their legal age of majority to 18 in 
response,41 which influences policies such as aging out of foster care 
at 18,42 and entitlement to child support beyond 18.43  This Part seeks 
 
 39. Wiltz, supra note 18. 
 40. See The 26th Amendment, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/united-
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to surface the dynamic between voting age arguments and 
conceptions of the need to protect youth. 
The following Section considers the kinds of arguments that appear 
in the debate, looking for theories of childhood, democracy, 
citizenship, and development that are deployed in the discussions, in 
order to anchor developmental equality in political history and 
discourse. 
A. The Civic Elevation of the Age 18 
It is not difficult to identify the cause of the 18-year-old voting age, 
especially since cause does not need full coherence.  There was a 
single over-arching mode of argument that was persuasive in lowering 
the voting age to 18, and that mode of argument compared the age of 
military service to the age of voting.  In 1942, President Franklin 
Roosevelt led a successful effort to lower the age for conscription into 
the armed services to 18, and a consensus quickly developed that 
voting should accompany involuntary service.44  The effort to lower 
the voting age began as soon as the conscription age changed, with 
serious proposals to pass a constitutional amendment lowering the 
voting age as early as 1944.45  The Vietnam War propelled that 
consensus into action.46  In 1971, the 26th Amendment to the 
Constitution was ratified, setting the voting age at 18, where it had 
previously been 21.47  The causal explanation for the 18-year voting 
age, then, is the tethering of voting age to the age for military service: 
“old enough to fight, old enough to vote” was the rallying cry of the 
26th Amendment movement.48  Put differently, the cause for the 18-
year-old voting age is that the age for military service was lowered to 
18.  The voting age did not advance in its own right but in relation to 
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civic obligations of adulthood.  This particular disparity between 
voting and service ages in the line between childhood and adulthood 
became untenable.  This was not, in effect, an argument about 
development.  It was an argument about justice in two anchors of 
civic adulthood. 
i. Benchmarking: Setting the Voting Age at the Age of Military 
Service 
The law allocates various privileges of childhood and adulthood at 
different ages, generally falling between 16 and 21; the literature 
discussing civic maturity raises questions of consistency from one 
specific domain to the next, with age decisions grounded as often in 
pragmatics as in political theory.49  Yet the argument for a 
relationship between military service and the franchise is particularly 
compelling; it seems true that if you are old enough to die for your 
country, you are old enough to participate in its democratic 
processes.50  Benchmarking is a powerful force in arguments about 
the transition to adulthood, no place more clearly than the military as 
a benchmark for voting.  I am seeking to illustrate that voting by the 
association to other incidents of adulthood does not in itself prove the 
case for voting, though benchmarking of a new 16-year-old voting age 
may enhance the legal maturity of the age 16 more broadly. 
Given that younger military conscription came before younger 
voting, their equation begs a question: What makes a person old 
enough to die for their country?  Surprisingly, it was in part the 
immaturity of 18-year-olds, not their maturity, that fueled their 
conscription.  The age for military conscription was lowered to 18 
from 21 at a time when the country needed more soldiers, particularly 
those who were not yet married with dependents.51  There was value 
in expanding the overall pool of men to fight by adding 18–20-year-
olds, yet the benefit of the younger draft was in part that 18-year-olds 
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had less civic maturity than those older men, who were already 
supporting dependents.52  No military casualty is welcome, but the 
death of a soldier with young children or a wife was thought to be the 
worst kind, impacting financial dependents and cutting into the 
family.53  In 1942, Congress granted draft deferment to married 
men,54 with Senator Joshua Lee of Oklahoma saying “[w]e want the 
unmarried men taken first.”55  In this sense, the military was looking 
not just for more people but for younger people, who had not yet 
matured into married life or parenthood.  The age of 18 represented 
to the military some sweet spot between childhood and adulthood. 
Some may believe that the decision was driven by a conception of 
mature adulthood presaging today’s neuroscience, but there is 
evidence that it was driven by a peculiar military decision to exploit 
the unattached immaturity of the 18-year-old. 
Despite the intuitive nexus between service and voting, the current 
voting age movement hopes to separate the two for analysis.  Its claim 
might be that a 16-year-old is ready to vote, but not yet ready to serve 
in the military.  Indeed, I doubt very much that advocates of 16-year-
old voting would want any analogies made to military service that 
would suggest the introduction of a lower draft or enlistment age.  
Those advocates would likely see a conscripted or enlisted 16-year-
old as a child-soldier, because in the military context, a 16-year-old 
looks to most people like a child. 
Once the decision to draft 18-year-olds was embedded in civic 
understanding, the case for voting age parity was intuitively 
compelling, but still worthy of analysis.  A general notion of highest 
civic duty (military service) and highest civic right (the franchise) as a 
benchmarked pair might be grounded in different theories, in 
addition to benchmarking as its own argument.  One theory is that 18-
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year-olds have earned the right of political participation through their 
acts of military service.  A second is that the possibility of forced 
service demonstrates the stake that 18-year-olds have in the outcome 
of political debates.  Benchmarking in and of itself, earned franchise, 
and a stake in politics all re-appear in debates over the current effort 
to lower the voting age to 16. 
ii. Earning the Vote Through Service in the Military 
The argument for earned franchise at 18 has rhetorical force so 
strong that it seems to require little unpacking.  Yet women, too, 
received the franchise at 18, though they have not been subject to the 
military draft,56 and the vast majority of 18 to 21-year-olds never 
“earned” their right to vote by actually serving in the military.57  In an 
earned franchise argument, the age itself must be the important focal 
point: “old enough to fight, old enough to vote.”58  If so, the notion 
that the franchise is earned with service is not the truth of the case; 
the case rests on a theory about the age 18, an age that has itself been 
burnished and elevated in many aspects by the fact that it is useful to 
the military.  In this way, 18 as a status has earned the right to vote.  
Conceptions of the age 18 developed over the twentieth century are 
not necessarily well supported by twenty-first-century neuroscience, 
which is showing that the cognitive capacity continues to develop into 
a person’s mid-twenties.59  This new information is unlikely to change 
the political equation of military service with the franchise, if 18-year-
olds vote because their exposure to military service is a form of 
earning the franchise. 
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iii. Stakeholding: Enfranchising Citizens Who Have a Stake in 
Political Issues 
The second argument for benchmarking the voting age against the 
age of military service is that the possibility of conscription at 18, and 
the risk of death, places an intense spotlight on the stake an 18-year-
old has in choosing political leaders.  One choice may increase the 
chance of foolish war, another the chance of righteous war, a third 
choice might lead to a lower conflict path to achieving national goals.  
This is also intuitively persuasive.  Yet if you turn 18 in January, you 
might be drafted before you ever cast your first vote in a national 
election, the level of government at which questions of war are 
decided.  To influence the likelihood of your own death at war, it 
might make sense to extend the franchise to 14 or 15, when the roots 
of future conflict still allow for diplomatic approaches.  Perhaps this 
states the argument too literally — it is not that voting at 18 increases 
or decreases your own risk of sacrificing your life for your country.  
Rather, voting at 18 becomes a proxy for 18-year-olds as a group, 
today and in the future, who may be subject to the military draft.  The 
18-year-old age group has a substantial stake in electoral outcomes, 
and should therefore participate in elections.  Given the vast 
developmental inequality beginning at birth for children born into 
poverty and experiencing unequal schooling, we might think that 5-
year-olds also have substantial stake in government policy sufficient 
to justify their participation in elections.60  Yet the death risk 
associated with the draft gives unique force to the arguments about a 
“stake” in the choice of representatives in government. 
The next Section explores these three modes of argument 
underlying the military-voting link that supports the age 18 franchise 
in the age 16 context: benchmarking to an age respected for 
independent reasons, earned participation in the political process, and 
stakeholder arguments (enfranchisement because of “skin in the 
game”).  It considers the use of each in the current debates over a 16-
year-old voting age, and the risks.  Finally, this Section describes an 
additional set of arguments appearing in the new debate that relate to 
developmental neuroscience rather than to benchmarking, and that 
link the science of development to the potential improvement of 
democracy through increasing rates of participation in elections. 
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B. Translation of the Age 18 Arguments to the Age 16 
The arguments for lowering the voting age to 18 were successful 
and had intuitive and substantive force.  An examination of today’s 
movement to lower the voting age to 16 shows parallels to those 
winning arguments for the 26th Amendment, with military service the 
most striking difference from those arguments. 
i. Benchmarking 
Given the history, perhaps it is unsurprising that arguments both 
for and against a 16-year-old voting age are overwhelmingly 
embedded in comparison to other “ages of adulthood.”  In 
newspapers and other short-form media, in particular, discussion of 
lowering the voting age centers around a litany of activities tied to 
various ages, depending on the writer’s position.  Children can drive 
when they turn 16 and cannot drink until they turn 21, and until they 
turn 18, for example, children may not be held to their contracts, buy 
cigarettes or a lottery ticket, marry without parental permission, get a 
ten year passport, or work full-time during the school year.61  
Accordingly, this argument goes, individuals should not be able to 
vote until they turn 18.  The argument from consistency and 
benchmarking is marshaled by proponents of lowering the voting age 
as well.  After all, 16-year-olds can be subject to adult prosecution, 
pay taxes on wages, drive cars, engage in sexual conduct, and may 
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https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/02/09/age_discrimination_for_the_you
ng_100223.html [https://perma.cc/PA54-7NST]; Talk of the Nation: When Does 
Responsibility Begin? 16, 18, 21?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 7, 2009), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113579236 
[https://perma.cc/M9RU-8XT5]. 
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even donate blood.62  These responsibilities suggest a flexible process 
of arriving at adulthood, with a number of indications that 16-year-
olds have been judged by society to possess significant capabilities 
and responsibilities to the state that may align with exercising the 
franchise.  Yet the age of majority remains 18 in almost all states, with 
children’s entitlement to parental and state protection ending when 
they reach that age.63  The vast majority of less visible regulations and 
private law treat 18 as the end of legal childhood protections, or 
disabilities, which are often the same thing. 
These arguments for voting from comparison to other incidents of 
adulthood may sound in benchmarking logic, but they may also 
collapse in that logic, because we are not perfectly consistent across 
our age-based benchmarks for adulthood.  In addition, we cannot 
even organize our age-based gateways by developmental milestones, 
with each gateway determined by the particular cognitive maturity 
needed for the task in question relative to the average developmental 
age.  To the contrary, the ages set for various gateways seem to serve 
the needs of the system rather than reflect the maturity of the child.  
Sixteen-year-olds are particularly ill-prepared to begin driving 
because they still have poor impulse control, even as they may possess 
the maturity of an adult in more deliberative contexts.64  Yet they 
drive at 16, through a combination of poor public transportation 
alternatives, poor suburban design that generates car dependency, 
rural car dependency, and significant legal subsidy to automobile 
usage over other forms of transportation.65  Sixteen-year-olds crash 
and die at significantly higher rates than their 18-year-old 
counterparts.66  In some places, they may drive a car at 16,67 but 
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cannot choose to bypass a bicycle helmet until they are 18,68 though a 
helmet decision is less impulsive than braking distance.  There is 
simply no benefit to allowing the 16-year-old to go without a helmet, 
while there is a societal benefit to the 16-year-old driving a car, 
whatever the risks.  This age evaluation is not about maturity; it is 
pragmatic. 
Yet voting is not the bureaucratic and pragmatic incident of the 
maturation process and pragmatic needs that driving is, but rather the 
most significant metric of citizenship against which other gateways 
will be measured.  If benchmarking has intuitive appeal that has and 
will translate into policy, we need to be forward-looking about what 
could be benchmarked to a lower voting age in future debates.  For 
example, a 16-year-old voting age risks beating back an active effort 
to raise the driving age to 18, one endorsed by the Insurance Institute 
for Highway Safety.69  If benchmarking has force in the debate over 
16-year-old voting, that debate should focus on the potential harm 16-
year-old voting could inflict on other areas of law, given the weight 
and authority of the franchise.  Rather than examining what we 
currently ask of 16-year-olds and grant to 16-year-olds, we need to 
consider what else we might come to ask of them in a world with 16-
year-old voting. 
ii. Stakeholder Arguments 
Some argue that because 16-year-olds are still supported by their 
parents and are usually not in the workforce, they do not have “skin 
in the game.”70  The same argument can support a voting age of 16, 
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though, because 16-year-olds are often in the workforce part-time, 
and pay taxes on their earnings to the government in which they have 
no voting voice.  While military service is the literal “skin in the 
game,” we should remember that public education is one of the most 
substantial uses of government resources, and children certainly have 
a stake in its quality, character, and level of funding. 
The stakeholder question does not rest solely on the rights of 
children to shape their destiny, but on the impact that electoral 
accountability has on political agendas.  Politicians campaign 
vigorously on addressing the costs of higher education,71 an issue of 
great interest to 18-year-old voters.  However, elementary school 
funding is not the center of anyone’s campaign, unless the campaign is 
focused on the worthy cause of raising teacher pay,72 a focus which 
results from a constituency of adult voters more than from a desire to 
direct funds to children.73  Regardless of whether children have the 
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mental capacity to make an electoral decision, they are stakeholders 
from the start, and their lack of franchise may shape the government 
resources allocated to them.74  Within ten years, the federal 
government will spend half its resources on adults over age 65.75  At 
present, the federal government spends only one-quarter of the 
amount on children that it does on adults over 65.76  Whether this is 
justified on the merits, it certainly coincides with the voter/nonvoter 
divide and supports the role that “stakeholder” arguments could play 
in lowering the voting age.  Some have argued that as long as children 
cannot vote, if we expect their parents’ votes to protect their interests, 
we should be granting parents an extra vote for each child they have, 
to be a proxy vote cast on the child’s behalf as their legal 
representative.77  Finally, the stakeholder argument against 16-year-
olds neglects to consider the problems of the future.  Arguably, adult 
voters are particularly bad at considering either the climate crisis or 
the national debt, for example — both having long time horizons of 
greatest significance to children, and highly discounted by older 
voters.78 
iii. Earning the Vote 
While 16-year-olds, and younger children, have a substantial stake 
in the choice of elected representatives, their service to their country 
is relatively weak.  While some 16-year-olds do work and pay taxes to 
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the government on their wages,79 many do not,80 and even those who 
do work are sometimes prevented by law from working full-time 
during the school year.81  Relative to earning the franchise through 
military service to the nation, 16-year-olds have not earned the vote 
through service, other than the payment of a relatively small amount 
in taxes. 
Yet there is a second way that 18-year-olds “earned” their 
franchise: through political engagement.  Youth activism during the 
Vietnam War was intense, and the political system saw the exercise of 
that generation’s collective political voice in protests, legislative 
testimony, publications, as well as protest music, art, and literature.82  
While the military age was lowered during World War II, the visibility 
of a collective youth constituency did not emerge until the political 
turbulence of the 1960s, which saw “children” between 18 and 21 
participate in direct action civil rights protests, freedom summer, the 
1968 Democratic convention protests in Chicago, and anti-war 
protests across the country.83  The development of a meaningful 
collective political voice of a generation not-yet-21 can be 
characterized as part of the “earning” process, in the sense of 
demonstrating readiness for civic engagement. 
This argument — that readiness to vote is demonstrated by 
meaningful political mobilization — plays a significant role in the 
movement to lower the voting age to 16.  Most recent literature about 
the voting age highlights the Parkland, Florida students, who survived 
a mass shooting at their high school and quickly mobilized a youth 
political movement in favor of gun control legislation.84  Parkland 
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galvanized youth to organize the 2018 March for Our Lives in D.C. 
and over 800 locations across the country, one of the largest protests 
in U.S. history.85  March for Our Lives, Never Again MSD (Marjory 
Stoneham Douglas High School, the site of the shooting), and the 
online and in-person activism of the Parkland students have fueled 
claims for the franchise for those ready and able to exercise their 
political voice so effectively.86  The Parkland students might serve as 
the emblem of what political agency looks like among teenagers when 
adequate community resources have supported their childhood 
development.  A global youth climate strike in September of 2019 
demonstrated the ability of youth to work internationally on future-
directed activism.87  The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement 
engages young adults in political action as well, through direct action 
protests as well as political lobbying,88 though it is less frequently 
cited when marshaling arguments for the youth franchise,89 as its 
events are often portrayed in the media as spontaneous and stochastic 
rather than strategic examples of an earned political voice.90  These 
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media portrayals underestimate the organization and efficacy within 
the BLM movement,91 just as media portrayals failed to grasp the 
strategic sophistication of the civil rights direct action protests of the 
1960s.92  The icons of the movement to lower the voting age seem to 
be drawn most often from Parkland and not BLM, a problem that 
reflects a concern this Article raises about the relationship between 
the 16 voting age movement, developmental injustice, and the under-
aged grooming of African American youth to lose the franchise 
through involvement with the juvenile justice system. 
C. Newcomer Arguments for Lowering the Voting Age to 16 
As the previous discussion suggests, some of the arguments for 
lowering the voting age to 16 have correlates in the successful effort 
to lower the voting age to 18 fifty years ago.  But there are new modes 
of argument, not seen in the 26th Amendment debate, that are 
prominent in today’s movement, and they feature developmental 
neuroscience.  The relationship between Dowd’s work in support of 
developmental equality and the movement to lower the voting age is 
underscored by these more recent modes of argument fueling this 
political movement.  These arguments are grounded first in cognitive 
development neuroscience, and second in the role of development in 
creating a voting habit. 
i. Cognitive Development 
Arguments from developmental neuroscience have begun 
appearing throughout the legal system, whether deployed to mitigate 
negative consequences of immature behavior, including the impulsive 
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commission of crimes,93 or instead to justify the developmental 
capacity for adult decision-making in the reproductive context.94  
Though age-based legal capacities remain overwhelmingly 
determined by “common knowledge” of maturity and practical need 
for bright lines tied to particular activities, courts and legislatures are 
increasingly referencing developmental neuroscience when making 
decisions about the appropriate legal standard to apply to a minor or 
young adult.95  Given the move toward debating maturity in the 
language of developmental neuroscience, it is not surprising that 
developmental neuroscience emerges in the more serious legal and 
political science literature addressing the voting age.96 
Neuroscience supports the concept of domain-specific competence, 
meaning the developmental capacity to act like an adult in certain 
domains, depending on what portions of the cognitive apparatus are 
needed for a given task, relative to the typical maturation rate of 
those particular cognitive functions.97  Vivian Hamilton argues that 
the level of specificity about maturation rates of particular capacities 
has improved to the point that it may be relied on to make decisions 
about regulating the passage to adulthood by domain.  In particular, 
teenagers are ready to make considered judgments at an earlier age 
than they are prepared to make pressured decisions.  Teenagers are 
mature in “cold” reasoning but less so in “hot” reasoning: 
Converging research from several disciplines within the 
developmental sciences has established a reliable connection 
between age range and the attainment of certain cognitive 
competencies.  Research in developmental psychology and cognitive 
and social neuroscience explains not only that adolescents make 
notoriously bad decisions under certain conditions, but also why it is 
they do so.  This research explains that by mid-adolescence, when 
making unpressured, considered decisions — like those required to 
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privately cast a ballot in an election that has unfolded over time — 
their cognitive competencies are mature.98 
“Domain-specific competence” suggests voting at age 15 or 16 
would be appropriate because adolescents possess “adultlike 
cognitive processing capacities.”99  They have the adult capacity to 
gather information, retain it, retrieve it, and to reason.100  These skills 
are relevant to voting; they are deliberate skills.101  Adolescents are 
less developed when it comes to impulse control and rash judgments, 
which are influenced by different parts of their cognitive 
development.  That slower rate of development for impulse control 
can be used to explain why a 21-year-old drinking age lowers accident 
rates.102  Hamilton’s careful work makes the case persuasively that 
neuroscience supports the ability of 16-year-olds to vote, and 
questions of cognitive maturity should not exclude 16- and 17-year-
olds from the franchise.  Hamilton pairs this cognitive evidence with a 
general presumption of universal suffrage, exceptions to which 
require careful justification, and finds that maturity cannot be that 
careful justification for postponing the vote until age 18.103 
Note that the body of work on cognitive development and the 
adolescent franchise is decontextualized from other policy questions, 
including the benchmarking to other adult gateways, political 
conceptions of earning citizenship, and becoming a stakeholder.  
Moreover, current research does not explore the variability in 
developmental neuroscience, depending on life circumstances, that is 
the touchstone of Dowd’s work, nor does it notice the 
decontextualized subject in neuroscience discussion.104  Given a 
cognitive development framework relatively detached from the 
context in which children develop, the literature connecting 
neuroscience to voting age cannot reflect on the normative social, 
economic, and educational circumstances that could problematize a 
narrative about “typical” development.  Instead, the body of work 
promoting neuroscience as a reason to lower the voting age 
demonstrates the significant gap that Dowd’s book fills, one that 
credits neuroscience but places it in a web of external context and 
state action.  Viewing the new literature connecting voting to 
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development through Dowd’s lens, we can see that “cognitive 
readiness” to participate in the franchise, readiness to speak in the 
very political system that determines so much about cognitive 
readiness, is a complicated criterion to deploy in an ultimately 
political question about readiness to exercise political power.  
Considering development in the context of childhood experiences, we 
can see a different politics to the use of cognitive maturity in a 
discussion of political participation.  The question is one of political 
power, not what an idealized and supported teen brain can achieve. 
ii. Development’s Relationship to Voter Participation Rates 
Lowering the voting age may have long term net positive 
consequences for voter turnout by developing in youth the habit of 
voting.105  Precisely because 18-year-olds are making a series of other 
developmental transitions toward adulthood, including graduating 
from high school and often leaving home, they lack the attention to 
this one particular aspect of adulthood in the mix of other 
transitions.106  Based on this theory, introducing a habit of voting at 
16, when fewer aspects of their lives are in flux, will lead to a higher 
rate of participation in elections.107  There is some evidence from 
Austria that 16-year-olds granted the franchise do, in fact, exercise it 
at higher rates than those granted the franchise at age 18,108 bolstering 
the case for those who want to see 16-year-olds vote in order to 
improve their lifelong odds of voting regularly.  Lowering the voting 
age, then, may do something to improve the relatively low voter 
turnout across the United States, and advocates for lowering the 
voting age are motivated in part by this pragmatic impact.109 
It is this portion of the movement to lower the voting age that 
strikes most closely to the core of the dramatic injustice done by the 
developmental inequality described in Dowd’s work.  The effort to 
cultivate in teenagers a lifelong habit of voting by extending the 
franchise at just the right developmental moment — the moment 
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when they are becoming activated but are not distracted by the full 
burdens of adulthood — represents a high-order nurturing of the 
development of political agency.  By dramatic contrast, the state 
action within the juvenile justice system and school discipline systems 
significantly increase the odds of criminal justice involvement once 
African American youth reach adulthood.110  African American 
teenagers experience felony arrests at dramatically higher rates than 
their white, Asian, or Hispanic peers.  According to the City of New 
York’s 2016 Disparity Report: 
In 2014, the rates for Black males and females were 30.2 and 20.8 
times higher than their White peers, while the rates for Hispanic 
males and females were 8.5 and 6.5 times higher than their White 
peers . . . . Asian females had the lowest rate of felony arrests for 
individuals under age 16 at 0.1 arrests per 1,000 individuals, while 
Black males had the highest rate at 10 arrests per 1,000 individuals 
under age 16.111 
This criminal justice involvement risks their long-term 
disenfranchisement — the enduring denial of electoral political 
agency.112  African American children are being primed for that 
permanent disenfranchisement before they ever reach the voting age.  
Viewed through the lens of the franchise, it appears that we are doing 
everything possible to limit the possibility and potential that 
developing youth of color will become sustained citizen participants 
in the political process.  Reference to developmental neuroscience 
should not be deployed in the service of lowering the voting age if the 
developmental neuroscience is to be decontextualized from the 
developmental inequality wrought by unequal childhoods, especially 
when that inequality puts some children on track to lose the vote 
before they would ever be eligible for it.  If lowering the voting age to 
16 plays any role, no matter how inadvertent, in the further 
Adultification of children most likely to fall under the jurisdiction of 
the criminal justice system, that harm cannot be justified by a theory 
of overall enhanced democratic participation, unevenly distributed. 
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II. THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION FROM CAMPAIGNING 
The campaign for a 16-year-old voting age fails to capture the 
relationship between the disabilities that follow from the legal status 
of minors, and protection of minors.  The current debate over 
lowering the voting age to 16 is woefully lacking in family law analysis 
that conceptualizes many of the limits on childhood agency as serving 
protective functions worth the imposition on the maturing youth.  The 
campaign to lower the voting age offers meaningful discussion of 
whether youth will simply vote their parents’ preferences, or are 
adequately represented already through their parents’ votes,113 or 
have adequate civics knowledge to participate properly.114  But there 
is no discussion of parents as gatekeepers to information, either in a 
malevolent sense (“I would rather you not learn about Donald 
Trump”), or in a protective sense (“I can cut off your access to 8chan 
and prevent candidates from preying on your naiveté”).  Yet disabling 
youth from voting also protects youth from being the target of 
campaigning.  Substantial regulation already constrains the way 
entities may communicate with minors, in an effort to prevent their 
deception and exploitation,115 just as contract law protects them from 
similar concerns. 
Parents have substantial rights to protect 16-year-olds and to make 
decisions about who may interact with a 16-year-old based on a 
personalized adult understanding of that particular child’s needs.  A 
system that allows 16-year-olds to vote would either suffer because 
the young voter cannot legally access information her parent chooses 
to block, or it would eventually reduce the ability of parents to limit 
contact between outside adults and their children.116  For example, 
under federal law, a parent has the right to block military recruiters 
from communicating with her child through the mail, on the phone, or 
in person, if the parent believes that the child is too immature to 
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evaluate the prospect of enlisting in the military upon turning 18.117  
Both consequences of youth voting — contraction of parental rights 
and expansion of candidate access to voters — would present serious 
challenges to the current state of the law.  Advocates for 16-year-old 
voting may intend to mount a case that it is time to remove parental 
authority over 16-year-olds, but they have not said so.  A move to 
allow 16-year-old voting may lead to that reform without reflection 
on the protective function that parental authority can serve.  
Information and exercise of the franchise are highly entwined; 
tobacco companies have a First Amendment right to target voters 
with political speech.  Yet Vote16 activism has been entirely devoid 
of discussion of this problem with youth voting. 
While a thorough treatment of these family law issues is beyond 
the scope of this Article, the issues expose the movement’s relatively 
isolated view of 16-year-olds as political agents, a view that can also 
fail to connect to questions of juvenile justice and disenfranchisement 
that a developmental equality framework makes visible.  Advocates 
for Vote16 focus on issues around voting, while child welfare 
advocates focus on the capacities and needs of teenagers more 
broadly, and the network of protection associated with those needs.  
Until there is serious discussion of whether a 16-year-old right to the 
franchise will curtail a parent’s ability to close down access to that 16-
year-old, whether by a cannabis advocate or a white nationalist 
organization, the voting age proposal lacks a serious footing in the 
law of the child or the law of political speech.  Empowering 16-year-
olds to make adult decisions sounds in good parenting, but subjecting 
16-year-olds to adulthood, with its military service, its criminal justice 
system, and its constriction on parental protection, requires more 
thought, and claims from cognitive development need to include the 
political and legal context of childhood. 
Developmental justice requires developmental equality: a fair 
distribution of developmental supports and the fair removal of 
developmental assaults that are disproportionately allocated based on 
race.  Developmental justice also requires making room for positive 
rights, as Dowd argues.  Further support for a positive right to 
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developmental justice can be found in two enabling rights: the state 
law right to public education, and the right to vote. 
III. SEEING A POSITIVE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN THE RIGHT TO 
PUBLIC EDUCATION: PREPARATION FOR CITIZENSHIP 
A claim for developmental justice could find support in the history 
of public education.  Carl Kaestle’s Pillars of the Republic: Common 
Schools and American Society, 1780–1860, published in 1983, remains 
the clearest account of the historical development of government-
supported schooling, and explains the core relationship between a 
positive right to education and successful democracy: 
The nation’s Founding Fathers knew from classical political theory 
that the most stable governments combined elements of monarchy, 
aristocracy, and democracy.  But Americans had expelled monarchy, 
and revolutionary leaders stood firm against the creation of a formal 
American aristocracy.  How, then, were they to escape the 
degeneration into anarchy that they believed was the inevitable fate 
of pure democracies?  They pinned their hopes on a republic . . . . 
Here again, though, classical theory and much contemporary 
opinion warned them that republican government would not work in 
a country as large as America . . . . Education could play an 
important role in reconciling freedom and order.  A sound 
education would prepare men to vote intelligently and prepare 
women to train their sons properly . . . . To foster the intelligence 
required of republican citizens, some of America’s most eloquent 
political leaders looked to education — not just through the 
informal colonial modes of instruction but through schools 
organized and financed by the states.118 
Moreover, in 1787, Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison, 
“[a]bove all things I hope the education of the common people will be 
attended to, convinced that on their good sense we may rely with the 
most security for the preservation of a due degree of liberty.”119  
Liberty is the goal, self-governance the structure, and individuals 
ready to vote are the mechanism.  The Founders believed that the 
system of negative rights that would protect liberty required the 
preparation of the future voter through a system of state-financed 
schools — the positive right on which negative rights to liberty would 
rely.  Education, though provided by the states and localities rather 
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than the federal government, would enable both state and federal 
citizenship, which is essential to a functioning democracy.120  
Jefferson introduced a bill in Virginia as early as 1779 to provide free 
public education at the state level, and its preamble explicitly 
connects education to the democratic experiment of popular self-
governance: 
[W]hence it becomes expedient for promoting the publick (sic) 
happiness that those persons, whom nature hath endowed with 
genius and virtue, should be rendered by liberal education worthy to 
receive, and able to guard the sacred deposit of the rights and 
liberties of their fellow citizens, and that they should be called to 
that charge without regard to wealth, birth or other accidental 
condition or circumstance; but the indigence of the greater number 
disabling them from so educating, at their own expence (sic), those 
of their children whom nature hath fitly formed and disposed to 
become useful instruments for the public, it is better that such 
should be sought for and educated at the common expence (sic) of 
all, than that the happiness of all should be confided to the weak or 
wicked.121 
Reconceived as developmental rights, Jefferson displays concern 
over the development of (white) future voters, and made no provision 
for the education and development of the people he enslaved.  He 
treats the white citizen as normative, as developmental neuroscience 
ordinarily does today.122  Yet he expounded on a necessary link 
between becoming a voting citizen and the public provision of 
preparation for that role, even as he set whites and Blacks on 
radically different courses. 
How do we transport the eighteenth-century conception of the 
needs of democracy grounded in liberty into the present?  Arguably, 
Kaestle is describing a regime of positive rights, in the sense that the 
framers of the republic believed that participatory democracy 
depended on the preparation of minors to become effective voting 
citizens (and at that time, the conception was limited to white men).  
Almost 200 years later, the U.S. Supreme Court would hold that there 
is no federally guaranteed right to education,123 but recent litigation 
in a Rhode Island federal court seeks to raise the question again, 
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given the tight nexus between self-governance and public 
schooling.124  In 1973, when the Supreme Court declined to 
characterize a federal right to public education in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, every single state 
constitution already guaranteed a positive right to education.125  
Federalism manages the issue of the democracy-enabling positive 
right of education, and the absolute necessity of schooling in our 
federal system is recognized as a state function and guarantee.126  A 
right to education is already knit into the system of popular 
sovereignty, so the failure of the U.S. Constitution to guarantee it 
hardly undermines its centrality to democratic theory — voting 
citizens will receive some state preparation before achieving the 
franchise. 
This historical link between the negative rights of our 
constitutional design and a positive right to education bolsters the 
argument for developmental justice and equality.  The Constitution 
relies on liberties that need to be protected by citizen-voters.  Those 
citizen-voters themselves need to be prepared to become citizen-
voters to preserve the constitutional system.  State-funded education, 
on this original conception, is justified by the need to prepare citizens 
to self-govern.  Like voting itself, education becomes a structural 
precondition of negative rights, even though, like voting, it is itself a 
positive right, recognized under the state constitutions of all fifty 
states.127  It is a small leap from a positive right to education to a 
positive right to developmental justice and developmental equality 
for that same democracy-saving purpose.  As we break down 
preparedness to participate in the democracy into developmental 
neuroscience, we simply modernize the preconditions for a 
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functioning democracy committed to negative liberties.  There are 
positive rights foundational to negative rights. 
In effect, Dowd suggests that by the time we are old enough to 
function as citizens, developmental injustice has changed who we 
become based in large part on race, especially for boys.128  Dowd 
emphasizes the violation of equality values and the existing state 
action that creates the structures of developmental inequality to 
arrive at a positive right to developmental justice.129  Even in a 
government system entirely devoted to negative rights, an argument 
for a substructure of positive rights that enable the broader negative 
rights can include both developmental justice and voting itself and 
find grounding in early thinking about state-financed schooling.  In 
considering the idea of enabling rights within our system, the next 
Part explores voting as a positive right, and its relationship to 
development as expressed through voting age and through juvenile 
justice links to disenfranchisement.  Development and political theory 
of citizenship are intertwined, just as development and the disparate 
experiences and environments of children are intertwined. 
IV. VOTING IS A POSITIVE RIGHT 
Dowd mounts an argument that developmental justice, even if it is 
a positive right, can be achieved by reclaiming parts of constitutional 
history often found in dissenting Supreme Court opinions.130  An 
additional method of mounting her case can be advanced by 
grounding her argument in two positive rights that enable a 
functioning democracy.  The first is the right to education discussed in 
Part III, which appears in all 50 state constitutions.  This Part 
discusses the second, which is the right to vote.  Taken together, these 
rights set a framework for minimum requirements to operate the 
popular democracy, and the reasoning for each could form the basis 
for the addition of Dowd’s developmental justice to the group of 
positive enabling rights. 
Joseph Fishkin argues that in our system of negative rights, the 
right to vote established and improved in the Constitution is best 
characterized as a positive right: 
Voters need help to vote.  I do not mean that only a few voters or 
certain groups of voters need help.  State action is required if any of 
us are to vote at all.  The state must set up polling places, train 
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workers, buy machines, print ballots.  The entire enterprise of voting 
requires positive action by the state.  This is because voting is, 
inescapably, a positive right.131 
Voting is an enabling right.  We cannot enjoy negative liberties 
without a process substructure, and that substructure, 
enfranchisement, is itself a positive right.  A state may not withdraw 
the right to vote on a claim that it is equally discriminating against all 
citizens.132  The states must take action to create a voting structure 
that enables the franchise.  Similarly, Dowd’s lens can be used to 
argue that development is a process right.  This Article posits that 
voting may be a promising analogy to Dowd’s positive right to equal 
development: development is also enabling, and without it, teenagers 
suffer “lifelong subordinating consequences that are difficult or 
impossible to overcome.”133  Both childhood development and the 
right to vote are the preconditions to a robust political system 
grounded in negative rights.  Voting and a right to equal development 
can have common participatory democratic roots that can support 
Dowd’s right to development.  The debate over lowering the voting 
age is grounded in part in ideas about both development and the 
relationship between development and citizenship rights. 
V. THE DEVELOPMENTAL EQUALITY LENS ON QUESTIONS OF 
VOTING AGE 
Dowd’s structural lens and the political lens can be used to shine a 
bright light on the state of positive rights to development, their 
relevance to the republican system of negative rights, and the 
movement to lower the voting age based on the science of cognitive 
development.  We find one strong argument for developmental justice 
in the foundational theory supporting public education — the state 
needs to prepare citizens for self-governance to retain a functioning 
democracy through voting.  We also find an analogy for 
developmental justice in the right to vote: arguably, both function as 
foundational positive rights enabling a system of negative right. 
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Dowd’s work shows that the juvenile justice system is one of the 
government structures interfering with equal development for 
African American children.  The system disproportionately targets 
them, and experiences with the juvenile justice system dramatically 
increase the odds that a child will eventually be entangled in the adult 
criminal justice system if they are not already entangled in the adult 
system as minors.  That adult entanglement, with its roots in state 
action toward minors, leads to the permanent disenfranchisement of 
those in its grip.  In effect, we are disenfranchising African American 
youth before they ever reach the age of 18 because of 
disproportionate juvenile justice system involvement, rather than 
preparing them for a life of citizenship with proper developmental 
support. 
It is dizzying to attempt to untangle the political system that uses 
law enforcement against African American youth, resulting in 
developmental inequalities and eventual disenfranchisement, from 
the failure of a positive right those children should have enjoyed to 
citizenship-creation through developmental equality, a right that 
would prepare them to vote.  On the one hand, this Article argues 
that a positive right to developmental justice might be pressed as a 
precondition to a functioning democracy, as Jefferson believed 
publicly financed education was such a precondition because children 
and youth must be readied to vote.  That positive right to 
developmental justice might be secured through their exercise of the 
franchise.  Yet the system of developmental injustice strips many of 
them of the franchise before they reach adulthood, stripping them of 
the very rationale for the developmental justice of which they were 
deprived. 
Debating extension of the franchise to 16-year-olds, where their 
prototype is advantaged in development — whether imagined in 
neuroscience studies or media accounts of Parkland activists — 
highlights the distance between advantaged and disadvantaged 
children.  One may be offered the right to vote based on a narrative 
of effectively nurtured cognitive development; the other develops a 
criminal justice record before reaching the age of adulthood that is 
likely to lead to long-term disenfranchisement. 
Disenfranchisement is where the rubber meets the road for Dowd’s 
theory — where a potential political theory justifying positive rights 
in order to prepare children to become citizens is derailed by a 
practical disqualification from citizenship before reaching the age of 
majority for African American children.  This is the Escher staircase 
of positive rights to development, granted in order to create citizens 
who govern the state allocation of resources that then impair 
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development of too many African American youth and set them up 
for long-term disenfranchisement.  This Article seeks to translate 
Dowd’s theory of developmental inequality into a question of politics 
with the conundrum of popular sovereignty at its center. 
CONCLUSION 
I am impressed by the maturity and efficacy of youth political 
activism, and believe we are living in a remarkable and hopeful era of 
resurgent youth engagement.  Broadly speaking, I believe youth have 
the maturity and the stake to participate in elections. But elevating 
the teen political voice by giving it the formal power of the franchise 
poses a risk to the protective commitment we make toward teenagers, 
a commitment already riddled with holes.  Even in 
disenfranchisement, there is protection from entirely unfiltered 
political and commercial speech. Child welfare advocates fight to 
remind courts, educators, and police that 16-and 17-year-olds are 
children.  I am ambivalent about lowering the voting age to 16 in a 
world where we are not protecting the franchise for people whose 
involvement with the criminal justice system begins as minors and 
strips them of the franchise.  The contrast is too dizzying.  Voting 
activists seek both a youth franchise and the end to felony 
disenfranchisement.  Yet I listen to the de-contextualized deployment 
of neuroscience and fear that felony disenfranchisement will take a 
back seat to the broader power base seeking a 16-year-old franchise.  
Moreover, the enfranchisement of 16-year-olds, where many 
disadvantaged 16-year-olds are being primed to lose their franchise, 
bumps up against the political force implicit in Dowd’s argument for 
developmental equality.  In Dowd’s words, “[a]s youth develop, they 
are creating an identity that is either reinforced and supported, or 
not.”134  The cultivation and reinforcement of participatory identity 
for some, but not others, undermines the structure of rights as we 
understand them.  Through the developmental lens, the Escher 
staircase that is the expansion of youth voting rights and its long-term 
contraction comes to seem as unstable as an Escher drawing itself. 
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